In October, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia agreed on a series of three humanitarian ceasefires, each of which was broken almost immediately. However, the November agreement is different. It is officially a ceasefire that means the cessation of hostilities. But functionally, it is a capitulation by Armenia that contains a series of unfavorable concessions that lay the foundation for a more lasting peace agreement that will result from future negotiations. At this stage, capitulation brings neither peace nor stability, but it can at least ensure the security of the peoples of the region. It should be noted that the leaders of each country signed the agreement this time in place of their foreign ministers. The stability of the territorial settlement required by the ceasefire agreement is an important variable for the overall viability of the settlement reached. The agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities on the basis of the territorial status quo on 9 November 2020(4) from midnight on 10 November 2020. This initially led to several highly volatile situations across the front line, as the ceasefire immediately came into effect, cementing the tactical situation on the ground, regardless of geographical, social, infrastructural or other conditions. The often arbitrary location of the contact line (often the division of roads and other infrastructure) can lead to several problems in the future, especially with regard to post-conflict reconstruction and economic reconstruction. The return of the seven occupied districts around Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control also creates difficulties on the now restored old border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as the border cuts not only roads, but also some villages. But overall, without any effort to challenge their actions or turn disagreements between them into strategic decoupling, Russia and Turkey will continue to use proxy conflicts like this to violently reshape conditions in their favor.

After all, both have shown that they are willing to ignore international norms and pursue high-risk policies to reshape the regional and global order. This letter(1) analyses the extent to which the ceasefire agreement laid the foundations for a lasting, stable and lasting settlement. While the overall stability of a post-conflict situation may depend on a number of factors, this analysis focuses on three main variables that could influence the resilience of the post-war status quo in the medium to long term. The first and second – the stability of the current post-war territorial configuration and the uncertain future legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh parts, which continue to be administered by the de facto separatist authorities – represent fundamental and inherent weaknesses in the ceasefire agreement. The third factor, and probably the most important, is the Russian peace contingent sent to Azerbaijan to maintain the ceasefire, as it brings Russia`s political will as an independent variable that could fundamentally shape the entire unification process. According to the agreement, Russia will send a peace contingent as well as a peacekeeping center to monitor the ceasefire. The Russian peace contingent will remain in place for five years, with an automatic extension for the next five-year period, as long as neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia declares their intention to terminate the provision six months before the end of the period. After signing the agreement, Azerbaijan demanded that Turkish troops be involved in monitoring the ceasefire alongside Russia (although Armenian territories are not neglected), which both countries agreed to. Putin noted that Russia “will do it [peacekeeping] with Turkey, because we have very good experience of cooperation in the Middle East, including in Syria, where we are organizing joint patrols both in the Idlib area and on the border between Syria and Turkey.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov initially indicated that “no peacekeeper from the Turkish Republic will be sent to Nagorno-Karabakh.” But outside the contours of the ceasefire agreement, Turkey established a joint peacekeeping center with Russia and sent troops to join Russian forces in Azerbaijan. Russia continues to insist that Turkish troops will not be involved in the peacekeeping mission on the ground in the NKR, but will monitor the ceasefire from monitoring stations in Azerbaijan. .